Wednesday, March 9, 2022

Center for and Strategic and International Studies: by John J. Hamre

"I was wrong"

I was wrong. I have to start there. Last week I wrote that I suspected Putin was waging a sophisticated mind-game with all of us, and that he would suddenly pivot to a diplomatic peace agenda to catch us all off-balance. I was wrong. I was totally surprised to see the massive campaign that Putin launched. So, I have spent many hours over the past four days studying this situation from as many angles as I possibly can. 

First, we have to start with Putin’s speeches. Putin has been remarkably vocal in rationalizing his actions. I was surprised to see how he condemned Lenin and Stalin for creating the fault lines in the Soviet Union that contributed to its decay. The animating concept Putin continues to emphasize is that there is no real Ukraine—that there is just a Slavic people with its natural organic leadership in the Rus—Russia. Ukrainian nationalists are usurpers of truth, in Putin’s logic. 
 
It might be good to go back to recent history. In the mid-1860s, the Russian czar forbad any publication printed in the Ukrainian language, fearing the rise of nationalism in a restless territory. Ukrainians don’t think of themselves as step-brothers to a superior Russia. 
 
One of the most fascinating articles I read yesterday featured analysis by two relatively junior researchers at the Royal United Services Institute, a defense think tank in London. These researchers somehow were given access to public polling done by Russian intelligence services. (Normally I would discount two young researchers getting access to foreign intelligence resources, but I know the director of RUSI well and know of her intellectual integrity.) Russian polling during the last year revealed a profound alienation of the Ukrainian people with their government. When asked “would you fight to defend Ukraine,” almost 40% of the citizens said no. President Zelensky enjoyed only 34% popularity.
No doubt Putin was given this polling data from his intelligence services. He likely concluded that a massive quick assault would be successful, and even welcomed by most Ukrainians. He clearly anticipated that the Ukrainian military would fight, and the assault to date has been remarkably surgical by historic Russian standards. With 180,000 attacking forces, it is astounding that Ukrainian casualties to date have been less than 500. Russia is using drones, aircraft, and special forces to target the infrastructure of command and control of the Ukraine military. Yet the resistance has been far stronger than Putin must have anticipated.

There is no doubt there was widespread unhappiness within Ukraine with their government. This has been building for a long time. I suspect the Russian intelligence pollsters were right. But asking people “do you like your government?” is quite different from asking “do you love your country?” And in wartime, people emotionally conflate country, religion, and family and feel the best way to protect them is to band together with other citizens in the same boat. Popular resistance is growing.
A friend of mine—the former foreign minister of Poland—told me Friday “Putin will win in 7 days, and then lose in the following 30 days.” He based his assessment on knowing Ukrainians, understanding that the Ukraine Army, when overrun, will fracture into small insurgent cells and blend into the civilian population, taking their guns and anti-tank weapons with them. 

Here is Putin’s great nightmare. He began this operation believing the bulk of Ukrainians would welcome him as a liberator. But in the face of fierce Ukrainian resistance, he now has to militarily occupy Ukraine for a long time. Any new Ukrainian puppet leader Putin would install would lack any credibility. Just like the years after World War II, the Red Army had to secure the Eastern European countries until the new puppet leaders could build an organic domestic intelligence apparatus, police forces and an army to suppress their own citizens. This takes time. 
 
Geographically, Ukraine is 60% larger than Iraq. When we invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2004, we couldn’t control the countryside with our 110,000 troops. We needed to add another 80,000, and we still couldn’t manage it. Putin used 70% of his Army to invade Ukraine and unlike Iraq, the Ukrainians widely will fight Russian occupation. This is going to go badly for Russia. My Polish friend told me there is a rumor that Putin is mobilizing 50,000 Chechens to help with the occupation force. I have seen no corroboration of that, but this would be an explosion. Muslim Chechens as an occupying force would be extraordinarily unwelcome in Orthodox Christian Ukraine. (Russia invaded Crimea to overthrow the Tatar Khanate. In addition to gaining a warm-water port, Czarina Katherine saw the nobility of ending Muslim raids into Ukraine to capture prisoners to sell into slavery in the Middle East region.)
I also suspect Putin didn’t really anticipate European response to his invasion. Germany, embarrassingly, before the attack offered to send 1,000 helmets to Ukraine. Yesterday, the German Government announced it was sending anti-tank missiles and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. And this morning, the Government announced an emergency $100 billion infusion to rebuild a pathetically-weak German military. 

Last week a friend told me of a conversation he had recently with archivists in Russia. He said that during the past year, Putin was making direct requests for archival materials going back to Stalin’s decision back in the early 1930s to crush Ukrainian nationalism during the Ukraine famine of 1932-33. Stalin used the famine to crush not only independent Ukraine leadership but also to marginalize Ukrainian culture and education. 

I don’t know if you watched Putin’s “cabinet meeting” with his senior government officials. He was about 30 feet away from them. They cowered together, all looking terrified. It was a vivid illustration of how authoritarian leaders gradually isolate themselves. Putin’s self-created isolation now looks to potentially have been the cause of a disaster.

But . . . just a week ago I was confident there would be no war. I was wrong. I should hold off on such proclamations.

I always benefit from your perspective. Please drop me a note at JHamre@csis.org


No comments: